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CONTOURS OF AN ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN  
PEACE SETTLEMENT 
Anthony Oberschall1  
ABSTRACT Israelis and Palestinians have off-loaded the cost of their conflict to 
outsiders. The massive subsidies for Palestinians should be gradually withdrawn 
and Israel should pay rent for the settlements and lands it occupies. This rent will 
fund the Palestinian economy and act as compensation in lieu of the right of return. 
The Palestinian state will be demilitarized and neutral, and become viable through 
economic ties to Israel and international aid. Two states will coexist along the 1967 
Green Line, and East Jerusalem will be made part of “Jerusalem: one city, two 
capitals.” Peace-making will be backed by the major international stakeholders 
and the agreement will be legitimized by voters in both countries.
No one is under any illusions about the obstacles to an Israeli-Palestinian peace 
agreement. Yet ideas that seem far fetched in time become actionable: for decades 
no one expected that majority rule in South Africa would be peacefully achieved, 
and few anticipated that Franco-German cooperation and alliance after two 
bloody World Wars would give birth to the European Union. 
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OBSTACLES TO PEACE
Both adversaries profoundly mistrust one another and are internally divided 
about a “two-state solution.” Israelis believe that an independent Palestinian 
state will be a weak or failed state, not able to prevent attacks on Israel, as has 
been the Gaza experience, and that security will require Israeli  re-invasion of 
the presently Occupied Territories (OT) and military operations, as in Gaza. A 
peace process might precipitate civil strife among Palestinians, as happened 
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in Gaza when Hamas ousted Fatah through violence, and result in a hostile, 
unstable state controlled by religious and nationalist extremists. The status quo 
is preferable for many Israelis. 
Palestinians believe that an Israeli government will not be able or willing 
to deliver East Jerusalem as their capital or evacuate many West Bank (WB) 
settlements, outposts, and illegal Israeli sites because armed settlers and their 
allies will resist the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), and Israelis will refuse to shoot 
one another. A Palestine state will thus remain a “Swiss cheese” entity with 
limited sovereignty, and, like the status quo, not a viable independent state. 
Palestinian leaders also fear that signing the agreement might trigger civil 
war among Palestinians and their assassination by militants. The status quo is 
preferable for many Palestinians.
Neither adversary has had to pay the cost of the conflict. For decades Israelis 
and Palestinians have outsourced the costs of occupation to the international 
community and to their allies, who have become enablers of the status quo. 
Paying the costs of the conflict for the Palestinians means phasing out billions 
in international subsidies; for the Israelis it means bearing the full cost of the 
military occupation of the Israeli Occupied Territories under international law, 
including compensating the Palestinians for the Israeli-occupied West Bank 
land. 
Any peace agreement has to achieve a better and realistic future for both 
adversaries compared to   the status quo: Israel has to have security, and a 
Palestinian state has to have a viable economy. Israel has an interest in having a 
viable Palestinian as a neighbor instead of a failed state vulnerable to extremists. 
Two states and two peoples can coexist and prosper throughout the entire Israel/
Palestine area in what is potentially an economic “common market,”  but such 
cooperation keeps being disrupted  by violent conflict and threats to normal life. 
According to the historian Ilan Pappe, “Palestinians were sucked into the pool of 
labor needed by the Israeli economy…they provided nearly a quarter of the labor 
in Israeli industry in the mid 1970s [A History of Modern Palestine, p.202]. In 
the 1980s, before the first intifada, about one-third of the Palestinian work force 
was employed in Israel. Nowadays, 80,000 work permits have been issued for 
Palestinians to work in Israel, and thousands more Palestinians work illegally 
in Israeli settlements. One hundred and twenty thousand Palestinian workers 
commute to Israel every day [NYT 1/5/18]. The Palestinian Prime Minister and 
the Israeli Finance Minister have recently announced plans to develop three 
joint industrial free-trade zones in the West Bank [Jerusalem Post 2/22/18]. 
Economic incentives persist for overcoming political barriers. What is now 
micro-economic cooperation can develop into macro-economic cooperation 
when peace gets institutionalized. 
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The peace process will gradually deliver security for Israel and build a viable 
Palestinian state. In the short run, both Israelis and Palestinians will have to 
make sacrifices. The Palestinians and Israelis by themselves will not work out 
a successful peace deal. Major outside powers, international agencies and 
stakeholders must help achieve peace in Palestine, provide resources for the 
peace transition, refrain from proxy wars by taking sides, and exert pressure 
against extremists from both sides that are unwilling to compromise. 
CONTOURS OF THE PEACE AGREEMENT
The peace process will take place under the sponsorship and with the assistance of 
stakeholder states, diplomats, international agencies, and groups of experts (military, 
jurists, scientists, etc.) The Israeli and Palestinian publics need to know what the 
contours of the outcome will look like and have assurances about the openness, 
fairness, and enforcement of the process. During the Oslo process, incremental 
tinkering with boundaries, settlements, and security arrangements did not build 
confidence and led to breakdown. A shared vision of realistic peaceful coexistence 
and recognition of realities has to overturn the collective myths maintained by 
the Israelis, the Palestinians, and international stakeholders. Reality 1: Israel is 
permanent and will remain a Jewish state; the Palestinians are permanent and will 
not be  a quasi-colony of Israel or pushed out into other Arab states. Reality 2: Israel is 
an occupying power in WB and East Jerusalem. It has to assume the responsibilities 
of military occupation. Reality 3:  Palestinians have the unparalleled status of having 
the oldest unsettled refugee population in UN history and are the largest per-capita 
recipients of foreign assistance worldwide. The Palestinian state must end such 
dependency, develop a viable economy, and assume the responsibilities of a normal 
state. Reality 4. The end of the peace process will involve a peace agreement by 
two sovereign states, Israel and the Palestinian state, endorsed by the international 
community and legitimized by the majority of voters of both states. 
Two states, Israel and a Palestinian state, will be defined along the Green Line 
boundary (the 1967 armistice line); East Jerusalem will be the capital of the 
Palestinian state but institutions for Jerusalem will be created to make it “One 
City, Two Capitals” thereby avoiding an East Berlin/West Berlin-type divided 
city;  the Palestinian state will be neutral and demilitarized  (like Switzerland) 
with joint security arrangements with Israel; Israel will financially compensate 
the Palestinian state for land it occupies on Palestinian territory and does not 
vacate; in lieu of a failed state, the new Palestinian state will develop viable 
institutions, and  economic cooperation with Israel will benefit both peoples. 
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CONCRETE STEPS FOR PEACE
The adversaries must pay the cost of the conflict. Under the Geneva Conventions, 
Israel is an occupying power and “the occupying power does not acquire ownership 
of immovable public property in occupied territory” and the “transfer of civilian 
populations by the occupying power into occupied territory” is illegal. Israel has 
not paid for the settling of Israelis on WB land. Under the Geneva Conventions, 
an occupying power after the end of hostilities must ensure the provision of food, 
medical care, public health, and education to occupied people. When Jewish 
settlers arrived in Palestine, they purchased land: “By the end of the 1930’s, 40% 
of all expenditures of the Jewish Agency was on purchase of land and agricultural 
colonization” (Pappe, op.cit. pp.94-95); they did not appropriate land without 
compensation. That changed after 1967. As an expert wrote, “…probably most 
jurists throughout the world, including many in Israel, regard all the settlements 
in the West Bank as illegal under international law, specifically article 49 of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention…” (David Schulman, NYRB, 5/22/14). 
Israel has outsourced the obligations of an occupying power to the American 
government, which provides financial, military, and diplomatic support to Israel, 
and to American Jewish NGOs and donors. The security cost of maintaining the 
status quo is huge for Israel. For instance, Israel is building a 40-mile concrete 
and electronic security barrier costing $1 billion deep in the earth at the Gaza 
border to block tunneling by Hamas and Islamic Jihad (NYT, 2/12/18). 
The Palestinians have become the largest per capita recipients of aid (World 
Bank 2013, European Commission 2017): WBGS received $495 per capita 
yearly, double the amount of that received by the next largest group of refugee 
recipients; in Gaza, 80% rely on humanitarian aid, mostly for food; UNRWA 
operates one of largest Middle-Eastern school systems for Palestinians involving 
half a million students, pays 70% of the cost of teaching staff, reaching $750 per 
annum per student. The Palestinian refugee status and aid programs created by 
the UN in 1948 and 1967 have morphed into permanent dependency and an aid 
economy that dwarfs the real Palestinian economy. The international community 
and outsiders have become the principal enablers of the status quo. The U.S. pays 
about $650 million a year for all forms of assistance (Congressional Research 
Service, 12/16/16, “U.S. Foreign aid to Palestinians”).
The Palestinian Authority is not held to the norms of a modern state that is 
responsible for employment, social, health and education services. It will not be 
a normal state until it has a viable economy. “Refugee” status has enabled the 
outsourcing of these responsibilities to the international community, especially 
in Gaza. A stopgap measure has become permanent and has not brought peace 
and good governance for the Palestinians. 
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Outsourcing is coming to an end because the international community, 
including the U.S., is wary of being an enabler and because refugees and war 
migrants from Syrian and other catastrophic wars are making huge demands 
on international assistance (Alex Joffe and Asaf Romirowsky, “The UN agency 
that keeps Palestinians from prospering”  WSJ, 1/10/18). Because thousands of 
Palestinians’ food needs, jobs, and salaries depend on international assistance, 
this has to be terminated gradually in parallel with the creation of a viable 
Palestinian economy. International financial and technical assistance (e.g. from 
the World Bank, EU and Arab states), will be necessary for a considerable time. 
Israel will not empty the major settlements in the WB but it will assume the 
responsibilities of an occupying power and pay rent for settlements and the 
water they consume because it has an interest in having a viable rather than 
a failed state for a neighbor. There are about six hundred thousand settlers in 
blocs adjacent to the 1967 borders, East Jerusalem, and in some 130 settlements 
scattered throughout the WB. The Palestinian State can lease land currently 
occupied by these Israeli settlers to Israel; this would involve long-term, 50-
year leases for settlements and allow for the continuation of Israeli law and 
authority within them. Leases will also be granted for outposts, military bases, 
access roads, security barriers, and buffers, and are expected to be phased out 
after some time. Some settlers will return to Israel voluntarily when the IDF 
gradually withdraws from the Palestinian state, but some will not. Nevertheless, 
over time, the “Swiss cheese” aspect of the WB will diminish, without the use 
of force.  
Leasing land would be a cost-effective deal for remaining Israeli settlers in the 
new Palestinian state and a much needed source of revenue for the Palestinian 
Authority as international assistance is phased out. There is a precedent: Israel has 
rented land from Jordan for decades on behalf of the Israeli agricultural/military 
settlements in the Jordan valley. The assumption of gradual sovereignty by the 
Palestinian state requires the cessation of settlement expansion and continued 
loss of Palestinian living space. Concrete benefits accruing to Palestinians from 
an independent state would include secure property-, residence-, water-, and 
building rights.
The rents will go to several Palestinian Funds to compensate Palestinian 
refugees who give up their right of return, for government expenditures to cover 
the phasing out of international donor aid, and for Palestine state-building and 
economic development. 
A controversial principle is compensation for the right of return, when 
physical return is not possible, as it is not in any realistic peace settlement. At the 
termination of many conflicts, like insurgency in South Africa and the Bosnian 
civil war, and major regime changes at the end of communism in Eastern Europe, 
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provisions were made for compensating victims and their families. In South 
Africa it was part of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC); in Bosnia 
it was part of the Dayton peace agreement; in Eastern Europe, in different ways, 
new democratic regimes restored some property or instituted some compensation 
schemes. For making a peace settlement acceptable to the Palestinians, there has 
to be a compensation scheme in lieu of the right of return. Limits have to be put on 
who is eligible, and what the amounts are; there are precedents from the TRC and 
from the implementation of Dayton concerning commissions and procedures for 
doing this. Polls have shown for years that most Palestinians are willing to give up 
their right of return for financial compensation. 
The funds will be managed under international supervision or controls to 
ensure they are not diverted to other uses; this process is similar to the control 
exercised by international agencies and donor states for funds allocated to 
the Palestinian Authority, Palestinian NGOs, and International NGOs for the 
Palestinians.
A Rand study estimated that a Palestinian state will need a capital investment 
of $33 bn. for the first ten years. The Palestinian Funds will also raise money 
from other sources like the World Bank, Arab states, and Islamic foundations, 
the European Union, U.S., and UN agencies. The Funds will pay Israel for 
electricity, telecommunications, water, port facilities, transportation, technical, 
and other services provided to the Palestinians (e.g. the technology for irrigation 
agriculture and water recycling in arid regions that Israel has successfully 
developed). It is hoped that the economic, labor and financial ties between the two 
states will gradually grow into permanent cooperative economic institutions, 
building on labor migration and investments that already exist, perhaps later 
including other states like Jordan.  
East Jerusalem will become the capital of the Palestinian state under “One 
City, Two Capitals” institutions. The specifics of Jerusalem governance, its 
boundaries, its economy and governance under the two-state peace agreement 
will have to be worked out. Palestinian sovereignty will ensure that Palestinians 
will not lose their right to live in the city and will have voting rights to elect 
representatives who are accountable for taxes and municipal services. The topic 
requires a separate analysis and essay. Jerusalem functions now as a unified 
city, and the outcome to be avoided is a divided West Berlin/East Berlin-type 
city. Several Israelis and Palestinians have been reflecting on such a plan, cf. 
Daniel Seidmann “Terrestrial Jerusalem” (YouTube 2/6/18 Jerusalem: City 
in Crisis). In addition, there would be an international agreement for access 
to and administration of Temple Mount and other Holy Places. The current 
arrangements work pretty well and might be continued, but the faith communities 
will have to be consulted and approve.
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There will be security arrangements and enforcement, including 
demilitarization of the Palestinian state, banning offensive weapons, 
internationally recognized neutrality status (precedents Switzerland and 
Sweden), the decommissioning of weapons held by Hamas and other militant 
groups under international inspection, the dignified return of fighters to civilian 
status (as in South Africa, Northern Ireland, and Colombia), the release of 
prisoners held by Israel, and a declaration by both sides of the cessation of 
hostilities pending a permanent peace agreement. Fighters would enlist in a 
“trading violence for jobs or education” program. There will be agreement by 
all stakeholders to keep offensive military weapons out of the Palestinian state, 
to secure borders against weapons smuggling, and the commitment of outside 
states and organizations (Iran, the Saudis, Gulf states, Lebanon, Turkey) to stop 
support for those who reject the peace agreement. As security grows, there will 
be a phased withdrawal of the IDF and the gradual assumption of responsibility 
for security by Palestinian police. 
 The Palestinian state has to become economically viable; a gradual process. 
The two states have been partially integrated for decades and will become 
even more so with peace. The Rand Corporation and other thinktanks and 
international agencies have given this some thought and come up with some 
numerical estimations. Solar energy development and water management are 
obvious targets for joint projects with Israel. With growing security, Palestine 
labor migration to Israel will increase. The export of Gazan agricultural 
products (e.g. strawberries and vegetables) and textiles can be reestablished as 
before 2005; investment in manufacturing for export to Arab states will become 
attractive. As economic cooperation grows, agreements and practices will be 
worked out regarding the flow of goods and people, transportation, currency, 
official languages, religious rights, law courts, education, licenses and degrees, 
tariffs, identity papers, and coordinated governance, in particular for Jerusalem. 
Further side agreements will be made about timetables and conditions for 
phasing out the occupation and phasing in Palestinian governance.  
The Permanent peace settlement between Israel and the new Palestinian 
state will be approved by all stakeholders in an international peace treaty and 
legitimized through referenda by the Israeli and Palestinian populations.
CONCLUSION
These are guiding, preliminary ideas that are meant to start a discussion. The 
Israeli and Palestinian publics will have to be convinced that a peace agreement is 
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preferable to the status quo and to alternatives. Scholars can’t make that happen; 
leaders, public intellectuals, the media and international stakeholders can. It 
worked in South Africa when the leaders of the African and white populations 
came to share the view that a viable South Africa needed compromises and 
cooperation by both groups; it worked in Europe when German and French 
leaders understood that European reconstruction and future peace necessitated 
Franco-German cooperation. In time, it may also happen for Israelis and 
Palestinians. 
